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Abstract: Many illustrators have adopted “The Uncanny” and embraced it as the 
characteristic psychological effect of their illustrative style. While we might 
argue that other discursive forms are capable of conveying the effect of 
uncanniness, what I am interested in here is why it manifests historically via 
illustration in particular. I will divide my investigation into three propositions: 
first, that the Uncanny’s essential ambivalence is achieved as a literary event; 
second, following Ernst Jentsch and Masahiro Mori, that a key site of the 
Uncanny effect is actually within the material physical object and its potential 
for movement; and finally, following E.T.A. Hoffman, that complex textual 
scenarios and frameworks of storytelling comprise the locus for the philosophical 
theorisation of The Uncanny. The word “uncanny” is used in many contexts of 
the everyday.  But this chapter will argue that a critical perspective on 
storytelling is the best mode for showing how the Uncanny effect is a 
phenomenon of language—and its theoretical consideration is really a 
consideration of larger philosophical questions about our relation to language as 
subjects, and as objects.  
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This essay takes as its starting point the association of certain beloved 
illustrators with the “The Uncanny.”  In my years of teaching Illustration 
students, I have had the good fortune to be presented with conversations, 
essays and dissertations on illustrators such as Edward Gorey, Tim Burton, Dr 
Seuss, Maurice Sendak, J.H Williams III, P. Craig Russell, Dave McKean, Jon 
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Klassen, and many stop-motion animators, including the Brothers Quay, Henry 
Sellick, Clyde Henry Productions, and Paul Berry, among others, all of whom, 
arguably, convey feelings of “uncanniness” in their viewers. These illustrators 
have adopted “The Uncanny” and embraced it as the characteristic psychological 
effect of their illustrative style. While we might argue that many discursive 
forms are capable of conveying the effect of uncanniness, what I am interested 
in here is why it manifests historically via illustration in particular. What 
constitutive aspects of illustration make it a vehicle for uncanniness? I will divide 
my investigation into three propositions: first, that the Uncanny’s essential 
ambivalence is achieved as a literary event; second, following Ernst Jentsch and 
Masahiro Mori, that a key site of the Uncanny effect is actually within the 
material physical object and its potential for movement; and finally, following 
E.T.A. Hoffman, that complex textual scenarios and frameworks of storytelling 
comprise the locus for the philosophical theorisation of The Uncanny. My focus 
on storytelling is not to say that The Uncanny existed, or exists, solely within 
the realm of fiction. A phenomenon constituted in the 18th century, alongside 
the invention of wondrous mechanical automata and projection mechanisms 
such as the magic lantern, Uncanniness also pervaded the popular imaginations 
of entertainment, science, and spiritualism— particularly when these three 
entities merged.1 Today, the word “uncanny” is used in many contexts of the 
everyday.  But this chapter will argue that a critical perspective on storytelling is 
the best mode for illustrating that the Uncanny effect is a phenomenon of 
language—and its theoretical consideration is really a consideration of larger 
philosophical questions about our relation to language as subjects, and as 
objects.  
 
It would be very remiss not to prioritise the question of why eyes-- strange 
eyes, button eyes, moving eyes, blank eyes, hollow eyes, non-moving eyes-- 
are the singlemost applied signifier of uncanniness. This signifier seems much 
more complex in its depth than the age-old adage that “the eyes are the 
windows to the soul.” Something much larger is at work here. Illustrators of The 
 
1 For an extended analysis on the general “uncanniness” which pervaded not only the literature of The 
Uncanny during the 18th century but also the debates in philosophy and science, as well as in new forms of 
popular “magic” entertainment, see Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer: 18th-Century Culture and the 
Invention of the Uncanny, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press (1995). 
 3 
Uncanny, both writers and visual artists, partake in the larger philosophical 
encounter with the precariousness of believability and the inherent instability in 
the illustrative relation itself. Taking away one’s eyes unseats us from knowing 
through seeing, and exposes the unsteadiness of knowing something by way of 
hearing or reading language without the benefit of visual illustration. On the 
other hand, as we shall see in so many Uncanny writers and illustrators, the 
supplement of the image is also not always reliable.     
       
Recent examples of uncanny illustration join the genealogy of theory which links 
illustration with uncanniness. Neil Gaiman is a contemporary writer who, in 
many ways, “illustrates” Sigmund Freud’s well-known essay, “The Uncanny,” 
written in 1919. While Freud’s essay lays the groundwork in this chapter for 
recognizing that The Uncanny is primarily a literary event, we have Neil Gaiman 
to thank for bringing to light the particular literary act of telling a story as 
paramount to understanding the effect of uncanniness.  Gaiman, following Freud 
and Ernst Jentsch, will have read what amounts to the treatise on storytelling 
and the uncanny— the real motherlode of The Uncanny: German Romantic artist 
and writer E.T.A. Hoffman’s short story, “The Sandman,” published (in German) 
in 1817.2 Hoffmann introduces The Uncanny into the lexicon of literary criticism, 
and into the philosophical consideration of illustration. This single short story, in 
accentuating the act of storytelling as the starting point of the uncanny effect, 
indexes a larger Romantic crisis about the referentiality of language itself.  Much 
poetry and philosophy, and literary criticism of the Romantic period (early 19th 
century) identifies language’s propensity to move with its own momentum, 
regardless of a knowing, intentional subjective voice behind it. The figure of the 
automaton, circulating literally as a mode of popular entertainment and as a 
subject of literature and philosophy, runs directly parallel to the philosophical 
considerations of the autonomy of language at this time. As Hoffmann deftly 
conveys through narrative structure and content, this anxiety-producing 
predicament whereby words become untethered from an anchoring source, has 
everything to do with a crisis in knowing-- in knowing for certain whether words 
 
2 E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Der Sandmann/The Sandman,” German-English Edition, trans. John Oxenford, Berlin: 
Michael Holzinger (2015) [1817]. 
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carry authority on their own and can therefore be believed as being real or true.  
 
What I want to explore is the possibility that illustration works with this anxiety-
producing predicament in order to earth the language with reassuringly 
grounding meaning, or, in the case of illustrators working through the Uncanny, 
in order to theorise the instability of certainty through language. A close reading 
in the second half of this chapter of E.T.A. Hoffman’s narrative content and style 
of writing will foreground what Hoffmann presented as the human psyche’s  
desperate need for an accompanying image to a story. Hoffmann’s narrator’s 
compulsive drive to ground stories with images indicates his descent into 
madness, a madness seemingly brought on by a gradual deterioration of any 
recognizable outside referents to “reality.”  
  
Many of us have a sense of what uncanniness is from Sigmund Freud’s ideas 
whether we have actually read his essay on the subject or not: we think of 
houses that feel eerily unfamiliar, and of objects which appear human and are 
not, but are still, perhaps, animated. We think of dopplegangers and darkness, 
of dolls with frightening eyes, and we think of eerily repeated patterns that 
happen by chance. And we think of the strange feeling that comes from which is 
completely familiar and yet completely unfamiliar at the same time. Freud’s 
seminal essay, “The Uncanny,” published in 1919, comprises a nexus of the 
Uncanny, because it both acknowledges its predecessors in the subject 
(Hoffmann and Jentsch), but also forms the psychic substrate of subsequent 
thinkers of the Uncanny, such as Neil Gaiman, Tim Burton, and many literary 
theorists. Freud’s extensive gloss on the word unheimlich (translated into 
English as “uncanny”) in the first half of his essay heightens his reader’s 
awareness of the antithetical meanings within the German word heimlich, or 
“homely”, a word which eventually reverses itself in its etymological progression 
into its opposite meaning: unheimlich: “Thus Heimlich is the word the meaning 
of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with 
its opposite, unheimlich.  Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of 
Heimlich.”3 Thus, the figure of the nurturing home is put forward by Freud as 
bearing an inherent instability, which gives us a feeling of extreme discomfort. 
 
3 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” trans. James Strachey, in Standard Edition, v. XVII, London: The Hogarth 
Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis 1955, 226. 
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Citing Grimm’s Dictionary entry from 1877, Freud offers the following: “from the 
idea of ‘homelike’, ‘belonging to the house’, the further idea is developed of 
something withdrawn from the eyes of strangers, something concealed, 
secret…’”4 This theme of the house which conceals something from vision is a 
recurrent trope throughout many genres of literature, lending itself to 
storytelling and illustration as exemplified in The Dark by Lemony Snicket and 
illustrated by Jon Klassen, and Neil Gaiman’s “Coraline,” which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. We also see this recurring figure of the uncomforting home 
of Tim Burton’s protagonists, who never feel quite “at home” in his or her 
suburban American house.   
 
Freud’s prolific writing career covered case studies of his patients as well as 
essays on ideas within psychoanalysis, with a relative few essays venturing into 
theories of aesthetics. “The Uncanny” was one such essay on aesthetics.  Freud 
introduces this essay by explaining that not only would a psycho-analyst rarely 
address a topic of aesthetics but that discussions of aesthetics outside of 
psychoanalysis focus on theories of beauty, not theories of what is horrible.  
Because of the role of repression that he identifies as the psychic mechanism 
that creates an uncanny feeling, Freud feels justified in working on relatively 
uncharted territory.  He takes on the position of literary theorist in order to do 
so, discussing E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story “The Sandman,” written in 1812, and 
Ernst Jentsch’s 1906 essay, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” as his material 
for critical analysis. These two texts, he explains, are his predecessors for 
theorising the Uncanny as aesthetic effect. An effect of feeling uncanny is 
possible in life or in literature, however, literature, says Freud, is “a much more 
fertile province than the uncanny in real life,” because “…the storyteller has a 
peculiarly directive power over us; by means of the moods he can put us into, 
he is able to guide the current of our emotions, to dam it up in one direction and 
make it flow in another, and he often obtains a great variety of effects from the 
same material.”5 Freud recognises, then, a materiality and malleability of a 
story, and the role that the applied mechanics of the storyteller (their “directive 
power”) plays in what Freud will read as the psychic effects of repression and 
 
4 Freud, citing Grimm’s dictionary, 225. 
5 Freud, 249, 251. 
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castration upon the reader.  
 
In terms of the directive power of the storyteller, Freud was taking his cue from 
Ernst Jentsch, who also noted the role of the storyteller as someone who 
deploys mechanical operation, for the purpose of deflecting the reader from 
being aware of her own uncertainty about whether a character is real or not. At 
some unexpected point in being told the story, the reader stumbles upon the 
storytelling frame itself, asking the question: is the storyteller a “real” person, 
telling us a story from the outside of the story, or is the storyteller a fictional 
character within the story, constructing a storyteller persona? The multiple 
frames work by relating to each other, but these relations are not relations 
which refer back to a stabile point of origin, so they are not helping to inform 
us. Our uncertainty is enacted through our becoming aware of the storyteller’s 
strategy, of the artfulness of the textual construction, and, of our own feeling of 
being made an object of the storyteller’s operation. Jentsch’s observations about 
the reader’s uncertainty about what we might understand as the character’s 
“reality” constitute an operative “psychological artifice” which furthers the 
uncanny effect: 
 
In storytelling, one of the most reliable artistic devices for producing 
uncanny effects easily is to leave the reader in uncertainty as to whether 
he has a human person or rather an automaton before him in the case of 
a particular character.  This is done in such a way that the uncertainty 
does not appear directly at the focal point of his attention, so that he is 
not given the occasion to investigate and clarify the matter straight away; 
for the particular emotional effect, as we said, would hereby be quickly 
dissipated. In his works of fantasy, E.T.A. Hoffmann has repeatedly made 
use of this psychological artifice with success. The dark feeling of 
uncertainty, excited by such representation [as an automaton character], 
as to the psychical nature of the corresponding literary figure is equivalent 
as a whole to the doubtful tension created by any uncanny situation, but it 
is made serviceable by the virtuosic manipulation of the author for the 
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purposes of artistic investigation.6   
 
Jentsch is proposing here that Hoffmann’s artistic strategy entailed putting the 
reader into the position of the character within the story who encounters an 
automaton figure, and, into the position of an automaton, i.e., being 
manipulated by the agile direction of the storyteller. In this sense, both 
Hoffmann and Jentsch recognise storytelling to be a textual operation, a relay 
between subject and object on the figurative level of language and textuality.  
 
Freud’s reading of “The Sandman” takes a more thematic direction than that of 
Jentsch, however, Freud, like Jentsch, also approaches the story at the textual 
level as well. Hoffmann’s plot and characters will be elaborated below, but for 
the moment, I would just like to diagram the figures in “The Sandman” that 
Freud identifies as being interchangeable on a psychic level:  
 
The Sand-Man→Coppelius (the lawyer) 
NathanielClara→Olympia (the automaton doll) 
Professor Spalanzani <→Coppola the Optician-→Coppelius→ father    
Coppola the Optician→Coppelius the lawyer 
Fear of gouging out of the eyes→fear of castration 
 
This diagramming of the textual figures helps us to understand two points that 
Freud makes about how the Uncanny works.  First, following one of the many 
dictionary definitions of unheimlich cited at the outset of his essay, that the 
Uncanny, or unheimlich, brings to light that which would, or should, have 
remained hidden.  In psychoanalytic terms, this aspect is known as repression. 
When something has been expressed after being previously hidden from our 
consciousness, we experience the odd feeling of feeling familiar and unfamiliar 
at the same time.  But the repressed object or event is only repressed in that it 
recurs. The recurring figures by way of substitutable characters, for Freud, 
signify repetitions or recurrences of something repressed. We only know that 
something is repressed through the repetition of its original happening.  As 
such, “repression” and “the compulsion to repeat”, two hallmarks of the general 
 
6 Ernst Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” trans. Roy Sellars, Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities, 2, no. 1 (1997), [1906], 13.   
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Freudian approach, are interrelated. A feeling of automated repetition is 
illustrated by Freud’s example of a recurrence of the number 62. We may not 
think twice about having a ship cabin of that number, he explains, but as soon 
as we notice other figurations of the number 62 happening on the same day, we 
start to feel that something uncanny is going on, that perhaps a secret message 
is being communicated to us, and that we may be part of a larger pattern at 
work, a pattern which is beyond our conscious control.7 In this sense of it 
happening through recurrence, uncanniness happens through recurrence, 
returns, and repetitions. Both Freud and his predecessor Jentsch recognize that 
in this sense, uncanniness is more possible to achieve as a literary technique, 
because those repetitions and recurrences constitute what we also think of as 
literary figures or tropes. This literary assignation is not to say that uncanny 
events are purely an effect of textual mechanics. Uncanny events also have a 
correspondence to what is being represented within the content of a story, as 
we shall see below in readings of Coraline and The Gashlycrumb Tinies.  
 
Freud disparages his predecessor, Jentsch, for failing to recognize the 
psychoanalytical dynamic that propels the character Nathaniel’s actions in “The 
Sandman.” Freud’s analytical reading of Nathaniel’s identifications, repressions, 
and anxieties is convincing. The task has been up to subsequent theorists to 
carry on from Freud’s initial theorisation, opening up the notion of castration to 
encompass the anxious relation whereby we are cut off from the certainty that 
language promises to secure.   
 
The sleep-realm of dreams, in which the meaning of words and imagery is more 
obviously uncertain, is analogously “insecure.” When we are sleeping we are 
both unconscious (and therefore unintentional in terms of the language that we 
use), and, our eyes are closed, so that we cannot know by seeing.  For this 
reason, the folk figure of the Sandman, who visits children at night and helps 
them sleep by sprinkling dust into their eyes, has gathered around itself 
uncomfortable feelings associated with uncertainty, insecurity, and vulnerability. 
The writer Neil Gaiman took this figure as the starting point of his comic book 
series The Sandman, part of the Vertigo imprint of DC Comics, which ran from 
1989 to 1996 and featured the main character of Morpheus, or Dream, the god 
 
7 Freud, 237-238. 
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of sleep. Dreaming, for Gaiman, following Freud, realizes, in image-form, 
otherwise unrealized stories. Gaiman’s Sandman series, like Hoffmann’s Der 
Sandmann, is a story about story telling, describing itself as “a vast 
hallucinatory landscape housing all the dreams of any and everyone who’s ever 
existed. Regardless of cultures or historical eras…”8 In his version of The 
Sandman, Gaiman uses dreams as an allegory for the act of storytelling, 
framing the breakaway narratives across the series as stories being told from 
one character to another.9   
 
Although Coraline, Gaiman’s novella of 2002, does not thematise storytelling, 
his characters in this story clearly correspond to Hoffmann’s depiction of 
uncanny characters, particularly that of the “Other Mother”, who, along with 
Coraline’s Other Father and assorted creatures, lives in the other, scarier side of 
the house into which her family has just moved. As in Hoffmann’s narrative 
structure and similar to Gaiman’s Sandman series, the division line within the 
narrative frames between “reality” and dream or imagination is blurry, confusing 
for both the protagonists and for the reader. When we read Coraline, we identify 
with Coraline herself in her lonely explorations in and around her new house. 
Her parents don’t pay much attention to her, so that when she finds herself 
having crossed through a secret doorway into the attached and supposedly 
uninhabited house next to her own, which Coraline accesses through a bricked-
up passage way that sometimes opens up, we wonder whether she is dreaming 
or whether the other house, with its Other Mother and Father, could be “real.” 
The antithetical figure of the home, or Heimlich, resonates in Coraline, 
configuring the unfamiliarity and uncertainty as to whether the story is real or a 
dream. Gaiman personifies the ambivalence of the familiarity of the home 
through the familial figures of Coraline’s mother and father, who, like the house 
into which she has moved, are doubled figures. As she explores the other house 
which is not her own but which seems like her own, Coraline feels this 
uncanniness: 
  
She looked around the room.  It was so familiar—that was what made it 
 
8 http://www.vertigocomics.com/characters/the-sandman, accessed 02/27/2017. 
9 Many thanks to Dino Carobene, who made this observation in his essay “Neil Gaiman’s Sandman: On 
Dreams, Characters and Stories,” BA Illustration, Falmouth University, 8 May 2015.  
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so truly strange.  Everything was exactly as she remembered: there was 
all her grandmother’s strange-smelling furniture, there was the painting of 
the bowl of fruit (a bunch of grapes, two plums, a peach and an apple) 
hanging on the wall, there was the low wooden table with the lion’s feet, 
and the empty fireplace which seemed to suck heat from the room.10 
      
Like the unfamiliar familiarity of the heimlich, the Other Mother looks and 
sounds like her mother, but is the strangely perfect mother that Coraline never 
had, cooking lovely roast dinners, cheerily welcoming her, telling her constantly 
how much she loves her. The Other Mother’s difference from her real mother 
(besides being such a “perfect” mother) is signified by her large, frightening 
black-button eyes. The Other Mother, as the story unfolds, steals childrens’ eyes 
and souls, just as she has stolen the Other Father’s eyes and replaced them with 
buttons. Coraline’s own eyes are also in danger of being extracted by the evil 
Other Mother. Gaiman’s re-configuration of Hoffmann’s Sandman (who also 
steals childrens’ eyes, particularly when they are sleeping) as The Other Mother 
certainly warrants a more elaborate feminist critique, but for the moment, I 
would like to point out that Gaiman’s choice to signify the violent extraction of 
the eyes through the figure of the mother does reinforce Freud’s model of 
castration anxiety, because Freud’s theory also identifies the mother as an 
activator of this anxiety.  
 
Feminist readings aside, Coraline, in its amalgamation of Freud’s and 
Hoffmann’s use of “The Sandman,” is a generative text that points to the very 
performative nature of storytelling itself. Gaiman himself often discusses the act 
of storytelling as lending itself to further storytelling. In one interview, Gaiman 
considers,  
 
Can stories reproduce? Well, yes.  Not spontaneously… they tend to need 
people as vectors.  We are the media in which they reproduce; we are 
their petri dishes… Stories grow, sometimes they shrink.  And they 
reproduce—they inspire other stories.  And of course, if they do not 
 
10 Neil Gaiman, Coraline (2002), New York: Harper Collins, 71. 
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change, stories die.11  
  
Further “vectors,” to use Gaiman’s word, to the story of Coraline comprise a 
succession of illustrators, beginning with Dave McKean, then P. Craig Russell, 
and then Henry Sellick. Dave McKean was the first illustrator to work with 
Gaiman on Coraline. McKean’s carefully chosen moments for pen and ink 
drawings interspersed throughout the text lend the story a macabre, Gothic 
tone.  In figure 1, McKean’s drawing of Coraline’s Other Mother, as reproduced in 
the book, looks as if he’s drawn it on a torn envelope.  His lines seem to scratch 
the surface of his paper, mimicking the talon-like fingers of the Other Mother 
and leading our eye to releases of solid black areas of ink that pull us in to the 
creepy depth of the story. The envelope on which the image is superimposed is 
torn at the edge, a reminder of the fear that our eyes, as if buttons, could be 
torn away. McKean’s placement of the Other Mother’s arched and taloned 
forefinger just along the eye socket signifies the terrifying potential of his line to 
move even just a fraction.  This potentiality of sudden movement suspends the 
reader or viewer within a state of discomforting suspension of what might 
happen next, creating a feeling of uncertainty. I would like to put forward here 
the proposition that this suspended movement before possible movement 
becomes central to the illustrative character of The Uncanny, and, to the 
characteristics of uncanny illustration.  Gaiman narrates this state of suspension 
of certainty in his depiction of Coraline’s hesitation between the two distinctive 
sides of the house:  
 
Coraline backed away.  She turned and hurried into the drawing room and 
pulled open the door in the corner.  There was no brick wall there now—
just darkness, a night-black underground darkness that seemed as if 
things in it might be moving.   
 
Coraline hesitated.  She turned back.  Her other mother and her other 
father were walking toward her, holding hands. They were looking at her 
with their black button eyes. Or at least she thought they were looking at 
 
11 Interview with Neil Gaiman, https://www.brainpickings.org/2015/06/16/neil-gaiman-how-stories-last/, 
accessed 02/26/2017 
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her. She couldn’t be sure.12  
 
Gaiman’s writing alternates between describing Coraline as an object moving in 
space and as someone whose state of mind is unsure and uncertain of whether 
the Other Mother and Other Father were moving towards her.  
 
In P. Craig Russell’s 2008 graphic novel version of Coraline, the graphic novel 
medium is exploited for conveying the subjective interiority of Coraline in its 
ability to stretch out these hesitant moments of suspended time through close-
up drawings of Coraline’s facial expressions. The panels allow for the reader to 
differentiate semiotically between Coraline’s facial lines and body language 
when she is in her real house, and those aspects when she is depicted in the 
Other world, where the lines of her face and body language as drawn by Russell 
indicate her anxious and angry feelings, thus conveying a sense of doubt and 
uncertainty to the reader.13   
 
Henry Selick’s stop-motion animation of Coraline (Laika, 2009) introduces yet 
another illustrative vector, realizing the story’s uncanniness to the fullest.  
Neil Gaiman was keen on the medium of stop-motion animation because of 
what Freud would have characterized as its ambivalence between real and 
artificial, between what is immediately familiar and what is strange and 
unfamiliar. Gaiman explains, “[T]here is a different nature to reality in stop 
motion, because it is real, because you could reach out and touch it; but 
because these are not human, because theyʼre dolls, there is something 
intrinsically distancing.”14   
 
Stop-motion animation has often been deployed in conveying the discomforting 
feelings of uncanniness, as seen in the work of the Brothers Quay and Tim 
Burton, among others. Taking its cue in this regard from older traditions of 
object performance such as puppetry and automata, stop-motion animation 
 
12 Neil Gaiman, Coraline, New York: Harper Collins, 2002, 46. 
13 See Frances Barton, “The Uncanny and Storytelling,” BA Illustration dissertation, Falmouth University, 
2017, 10. 
14 Neil Gaiman on Empire Magazine video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gviEbYj8sZU. 
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reinforces the importantance of movement as being integral to our investigation 
of Illustration and The Uncanny. Stop-motion’s three- dimensional, tactile 
objects, shot frame-by-frame to convey that object’s movement in space, look 
as if they are moving by themselves, autonomously, but without conscious 
intention. Stop-motion animation often conveys what Bryony Carter has noted 
as an indicative hesitation before movement, a suspended moment that leaves 
the viewer in a state of discomfort and uncertainty.15 As a genre, stop-motion 
animation is aligned with automatons, robots, dolls, mannequins, and puppets, 
because all of these are objects, not subjects, of possible movement, signifying 
a manipulatability, a potential to move and to be moved. Non-human objects 
moving outside the metaphysical frameworks of intentionality leave the viewer 
feeling uncertain and unfamiliar.   
 
The spooky opening sequence of the film Coraline presents the figure of the 
Coraline-doll introducing the film’s character Coraline (who is actually a puppet 
anyway). (see figure 2) In the sequence, the doll is manipulated by a metallic 
skeletal hand (prefiguring the Other Mother character in the film). This metallic 
skeletal hand introduces the plot, and the larger uncanny predicament of 
Coraline’s brave fight against being an object controlled and manipulated by an 
outside, unseen force. This thematic predicament is framed by the technical 
aspect by which the hands of the animators move Coraline and all the figures 
about the sets, but are never visible to the audience.16 The stop-motion medium 
of animation makes visible the possibility of our own objecthood, that is, the 
possibility that we might not be able to consciously direct our own movement. 
We seem to be experiencing a strange meeting of our own subjectivity with our 
own objectivity, imparting a feeling of psychic disturbance: of “uncanniness.”    
 
The illustration of this uncanny existential objecthood is not limited to the 
medium of stop-motion animation. For example, Edward Gorey’s well-known 
book The Gashlycrumb Tinies, published in 1963 and still in publication today, 
exemplifies his particular unsettling mode of authorial practice, often gets 
 
15 Many thanks to Bryony Carter, BA Illustration 2017, for her thoughtful work on hesitation and The 
Uncanny in stop-motion animation.  
16 Many thanks to Isabel Ward, BA Illustration, 2015, for these cogent observations on the multiple 
frameworks of manipulation put forward in Selick’s film of Coraline. 
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characterised as uncanny. This book is structured as a childrens’ alphabet book 
from A to Z, but each letter of the alphabet refers to the first letter of the name 
of a child who has met a terrible demise. Gorey gives us a disturbing variety of 
terrifying ways in which each lettered child has died. His illustration, consisting 
of black ink drawings on white background, is reminiscent of a Victorian Gothic 
style and tone of voice, lending a morbid feeling to what would might have been 
presented as a cheerful childrens’ learning tool. Key to the reading of 
Gashlycrumb Tinies is the relation between the cover of the book to the inside 
pages.  The cover of the book depicts a macabre skeleton clothed in Victorian 
mourning garb, holding a black umbrella over 26 children.  The children stand 
within the black shadow cast by this figure of death and his ominous-looking 
umbrella. Gorey does not show us the skeletal figure again inside the book.  But 
that figure’s presence within the book is implied because of its placement on the 
cover, which introduces the reader to the rhyming explanation of how each 
successive child met his terrible death.  On a very basic level, the antithetical 
familiar/unfamiliar situation at play in the book would make it uncanny, but 
there is another, more deeply unsettling aspect to the story which, places 
Gashlycrumb squarely within the Uncanny, and that is the unsettling 
presentation of a larger, unseen power at work that manipulates the children as 
if they were mere objects, without an animating free will, to meet their 
inevitable destiny. The back cover of the book depicts 26 headstones, which 
visually enforces the childrens’ objechood.   
 
The psychologist Ernst Jentsch, whose 1909 essay “On the Psychology of the 
Uncanny” introduced for the first time an analysis of the uncanny aesthetic, 
recognised that a spectator or reader would experience a disturbance of their 
own “psychical harmony” upon viewing an object about which’s inherent 
animation they were uncertain. For Jentsch, the uncertainty or doubt as to that 
object’s inherent animation acts as an immediately performative signifier of a 
potentially disunified psyche, in which one’s own bodily motion could be 
autonomous from our intention and consciousness. Thus the experience of 
watching someone having an epileptic fit, explains Jentsch, creates a similar 
“affective excitement of the uncanny” within the viewer as does watching 
objects that appear to move on their own: 
 
It is not unjustly that epilepsy is therefore spoken of as the morbus sacer 
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[‘sacred disease’], as an illness deriving not from the human world but 
from foreign and enigmatic spheres, for the epileptic attack of spasms 
reveals the human body to the viewer – the body that under normal 
conditions is so meaningful, expedient and unitary, functioning according 
to the directions of his consciousness—as an immensely complicated and 
delicate mechanism.” (my emphasis)17  
 
What is extraordinarily compelling about Jentsch’s explanation, and what 
explains why he, even more than Freud, is the theorist important within the field 
of object theatre, as noted by puppetry historian John Bell in his essay on 
puppetry the Uncanny,18 is that Jentsch is identifying neither a pedestrian mind-
body split, nor a thesis on life, breath or anima within an object but a thesis 
about the manipulated body-as-object, in particular, about the uncanny effect of 
witnessing the body as an object that moves without its own intention or will. To 
clarify his ideas, Jentsch explains that witnessing an epileptic attack would elicit 
an uncanny feeing, whereas seeing an attack of hysteria would not, because 
hysterics “usually retain consciousness,” so that “their type of movement again 
frequently reminds one of hidden psychical processes, in that here the muscular 
disturbances follow a certain higher ordering principle…”19 What I want to 
highlight for the purposes of thinking about uncanniness and illustration is that 
Jentsch repeatedly identifies movement—and not simply animation, as the key 
element in creating an effect of uncanniness.  Jentsch does discuss the factor of 
doubt as to whether a lifeless object is animate or not, but importantly, he 
characterises this doubt as being related to movement, not life.  Jentsch’s 
account of a traveller who sat down next to a tree trunk which, “to the horror of 
the traveller, … suddenly began to move and showed itself to be a giant snake,” 
exemplifies the uncanny experience because: 
 
The mass that at first seemed completely lifeless suddenly reveals an 
inherent energy because of its movement.  This energy can have a 
 
17 Jentsch, 14. 
18 John Bell, “Playing with the Eternal Uncanny: The Persistent Life of Lifeless Objects,” paper 
given on 20 October, 2013, Falmouth University, Falmouth, at the Performing Objects 
conference, 17-20 October 2013.  
19 Jentsch, 14. 
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psychical or a mechanical origin. As long as the doubt as to the nature of 
the perceived movement lasts, and with it the obscurity of its cause, a 
feeling of terror persists in the person concerned.20 
 
When Jentsch mentions “obscurity of cause,” he is opening up a discussion of 
autonomous movement, which may present itself as “enigmatic.” (ibid, 8) The 
figure of the automaton as a character in a given story is, as previously noted, a 
successful “psychological artifice” deployed by E.T.A. Hoffmann in many of his 
stories.21 One example of many would be the figure of The Nutcracker, from 
Hoffmann’s 1816 rather scary story “The Nutcracker and the Mouse King,” 
concerning a nutcracker, who comes alive at night and introduces the 
protagonist, Clara, to the mice and dolls which also come to life at night. Not 
coincidentally, Hoffmann’s story of the “Nutcracker” became a ballet, with music 
composed by Tchaikovsky, staging and materialising the aspect of autonomous 
movement that I am underlining as being so constitutive to evoking uncanny 
feelings.  
 
In his discussion of the psychological literary convention of the automaton 
figure, Jentsch did not mention “The Sandman” specifically, despite that story’s 
prominent “character”, Olympia, being a life-sized automaton. We can see, 
however, how “The Sandman” illustrates Jentsch’s proposition that the 
automaton figure operates on various levels simultaneously. Despite Nathaniel’s 
instability as a narrator, we readers do sympathise, and identify with him, 
having been privy to his own accounts of the doubts and uncertainties that 
plagued him from childhood into his short-lived adulthood. We as readers know 
that Nathaniel has fallen in love with an automaton, and yet we still find 
ourselves in a position of not knowing what is “real” within the story: we do not 
know whether the evil advocate Coppelius is really evil, is really an eye-stealing 
Sandman, or whether Coppelius and the optician Coppola are one and the same 
person.  Are we ourselves like automata, moved by the unseen force of the 
storyteller? And if that is the case, is the automaton Olympia any more of an 
automaton that Nathaniel is, or as we the readers are? Hoffmann’s storytelling 
artistry lies within the ways in which he confounds the reader by mirroring the 
 
20 Jentsch, 11. 
21 Jentsch, 11. 
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internal story content with complex textual manipulation, that is, manipulation 
on the level of the language itself. 
 
Freud turns his own critical reading on the peremptory presumption that 
Jentsch’s observation about doubt and uncertainty in Hoffmann’s work “refers 
primarily to the story of ‘The Sandman.’22 But Jentsch mentions only Hoffmann’s 
name, not any particular story’s title, and nor does Jentsch mention the 
character Olympia. The specious assumption on Freud’s part allows him to then 
attempt to diminish Jentsch’s proposition that the automaton is the primary site 
of the Uncanny: “…I cannot think—and I hope most readers of the story will 
agree with me—that the theme of the doll Olympia, who is to all appearances a 
living being, is by any means the only, or indeed the most important, element 
that must be held responsible for the quite unparalled atmosphere of 
uncanniness evoked by the story,” writes Freud decisively.23 Thus Ernst 
Jentsch’s thesis on the psychological experience of the Uncanny was dismissed 
by Freud. 
 
Freud claimed that Jentsch’s emphasis on the figure of Olympia, with its 
attendant psychical effects of uncertainty and doubt, overtook the more 
important psychic dynamics of repression, repetition, and castration anxiety.  In 
Freud’s opinion, repression and castration anxiety clearly informed Hoffmann’s 
theorization of the Uncanny. 24 Freud’s neglect of any consideration whatsoever 
of an object’s movement – the closest he gets to this element is his 
characterization of Olympia as Spalanzani’s “strangely silent and motionless 
daughter”25 -- reveals a metaphysical blind spot that needs to be identified and 
unpacked in order to open up new avenues for understanding the relation 
between illustration and the Uncanny. The most credit Freud will give to 
Olympia as an agent of the Uncanny is that “Uncertainty whether an object is 
living or inanimate [my emphasis]… [is] admittedly applied to the doll 
Olympia…”26  “Jentsch,” Freud notes criticizingly, “believes that a particularly 
 
22 See Freud, “The Uncanny,” Standard Edition, vol. XVII, 226. 
23 Freud, 227. 
24 Freud, 226. 
25 Freud, 229. 
26 Freud, 230. 
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favorable condition for awakening uncanny feelings is created when there is 
intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate 
object becomes too much like an animate one.”27  Similarly, Freud mentions 
later in the essay the example of wooden monsters coming to life in the dark 
would be examples of something in a story that would cause an uncanny 
feeling.28   
 
As I have mentioned above, Freud never considers movement itself. He cites 
Jentsch’s noting of “doubts [as to] whether an apparently animate being is 
really alive”29, but never picks up on Jentsch’s isolation of movement in his 
consideration of animation. The difference between animation and movement is 
subtle. Being animate or animated is based etymologically on the Latin word 
anima, meaning “breath” or “soul”; if something is animated it means that it is 
alive, that it is “endowed with life or the qualities of life.”30 Movement is a 
quality often attributed to being animated, but it is not rooted within 
“animation” itself. To approach an object’s movement is to look at its mechanics 
of motion, and it is an approach which is outside the metaphysical frameworks 
of breath, life, and spirit. This approach the Uncanny from the point of view of 
signification, not from representation. Thus to consider whether an automaton is 
“animated” or not, as Freud has done, is to impose a metaphysical essentialist 
philosophical framework that only serves to block what I would like to argue 
here is the more deconstructive critical framework put forth by Hoffmann and 
Jentsch. The central role of movement in conveying an uncanny feeling needs to 
be recovered from the masking effect of Freud’s oversight. 
 
One of very few commentators on The Uncanny to identify movement as the 
key element to the creation of an uncanny reaction is the Japanese 
mathematician Masahiro Mori.  In his article of 1970, “The Uncanny Valley,”31 
 
27 Freud, 233. 
28 Freud, 245. 
29 Freud, 226. 
30 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield, MA: G & C Merriam and Co. 
31 Masahiro Mori, “The Uncanny Valley,” trans. Karl MacDorman and Norri Kageki, IEEE Robotics 
and Automation, 19 (2), 2012, [1970], 98-100. 
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Mori explains that we can mathematically chart our psychological relation to an 
object using the variable x-axis of human likeness as it relates to the function y-
axis, which represents our “affinity” towards that object.  According to Mori, our 
affinity towards an object rises the more the object appears to be like a human 
(for example, we are drawn to mechanical robots, human-looking robots, and 
stuffed animals), but our affinity only lasts up to a point, and then, our affinity 
falls drastically. This dramatic drop occurs when we have a sudden realization 
that what we are seeing or touching is actually artificial. As indicated on the 
chart as being below the x-axis, within negative value, we feel below our 
comfort zone. The intensity of the “Uncanny Valley” is made more apparent in 
Mori’s second chart, to which he adds the function of movement, as indicated by 
a dotted line overlaying the solid line already in the first chart. (see figure 2)32 
“The presence of movement steepens the slopes of the uncanny valley,” Mori 
explains.33 Movement amplifies the dip into the uncanny valley, which Mori 
illustrates with the example of the prosthetic hand, already located in the 
Valley, which plunges even deeper into the Valley if that prosthetic hand is fitted 
with electrodes which make it move.34  
 
The prosthetic hand’s implication, as a figure, is that some anteceding force is 
“behind” or attached to it, as the cause of its movement. That this moving 
object also appears to be a hand, or a manipulator of something else, 
introduces the uncanny effect in its confounding double function as both 
manipulating subject, and, as a stand-alone object which seems to move on its 
own. Mori’s choice of the prosthetic hand as his illustrative figure of the 
Uncanny effect coincides with other hand figures in the theorization of the 
Uncanny as an effect related to movement and automata. Here we can’t help 
but think of Neil McKean’s illustration of Coraline’s Other Mother’s cut-off bony 
hand, darting quickly, spider-like and articulated, towards Coraline, at several 
climactic moments of the story.  
Henry Selick’s stop-motion interpretation of that same hand depicts it as a silver 
 
32 Interestingly, many articles which have reproduced Mori’s graph only reproduce the second 
graph, but in order to appreciate how important movement is to Mori’s thesis, we must look at 
both the first and the second graph, as Mori intended us to do in his original article.   
33Mori, 99. 
34 Mori, 99. 
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metallic instrument endowed with the capacity for moving other instruments. 
(see figure 3) The invisibility of that moving force renders the metallic hand 
another object within a chain of moving objects, being moved outside of their 
“own” intentional control.  What I am suggesting here is that “uncanniness” 
comprises the effect of the scary recognition othat we might be objects being 
moved by unseen forces.  
 
The emphasis upon movement as opposed to animation in the theorisation of 
The Uncanny, exemplified by Jentsch, Mori and many illustrators, puts forward 
what is the deconstructive, anti-metaphysical literary techniques already 
deployed by E.T.A. Hoffmann in much of his work, including “The Sandman.”  As 
promised in my introduction to this chapter, a close-reading of “The Sandman” 
here will aim to illustrate first how the complex multiple narrative frameworks 
enact a feeling of uncertainty in the reader, and second, the role that the eyes 
and image-ination play in attempting to secure cognitive certainty within an 
uncertain linguistic scenario. Hoffmann’s writing is exemplary of much other 
Romantic literature which contends with the larger philosophical predicament of 
the reader’s suspension of knowledge as she moves between language as tropic 
machine, and language as a mode of referentiality and meaning.  
 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman” published in the collection Nachstucke (Night 
Stories) in 1817, presents us with the first, and foundational, philosophical 
enquiry into the literary phenomenon of Unheimlich. Hoffmann mentions the 
word unheimlich a few times in the story, but it is more than the mention of the 
word: the story enacts the affect, or conscious subjective aspect, of 
“uncanniness” within the reader. Hoffmann adeptly directs us from narrator to 
narrator within the story. The different narrative perspectives chronicle the 
mental breakdown of the protagonist Nathaniel.  Nathaniel has been plagued all 
his life by the spectre of “The Sandman,” a fictional character operating on many 
levels within the story we are reading. Throughout the story, whether the 
narrative voice is that of Nathaniel writing to Lothaire, of Clara writing to 
Nathaniel, or of the unnamed narrator to whom the letters between the three 
characters have been given (a narrator who, as interpreted in the opera Tales of 
Hoffmann, is Hoffmann himself as a character within the interior story world), a 
consistent call for the image is invoked by the act of recounting a story.  Mid-
way through the story, the narrator directly addresses his reader, explaining 
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how he came to tell Nathaniel’s story:  
 
Now I must confess to you, kind reader, that no one has really asked me 
for the history of the young Nathaniel, but you know well enough that I 
belong to the queer race of authors who, if they have anything in their 
minds such as I have just described, feel as if everyone who goes near 
them, and the whole world besides, is insistently demanding: ‘What is it 
then—tell it, my dear friend?” Thus I was forcibly compelled to tell you of 
the momentous life of Nathaniel…. I had to make you equally inclined to 
accept the uncanny, which is no small matter… So take, gentle reader, the 
three letters, which friend Lothaire was good enough to give me, as the 
sketch of the picture which I shall endeavor to color more and more 
brightly as I proceed with my narrative.  Perhaps, like a good portrait-
painter, I may succeed in catching the outline in this way, so that you will 
realize it is a likeness even without knowing the original, and feel as if you 
had often seen the person with your own corporeal eyes.35   
 
Here, the narrator appeals to the reader’s “own corporeal eyes” as the saving 
grace which would allow for the possibility of “knowing” the “original” person 
(Nathaniel). Thus, it is the visual image that might anchor the story, suggesting 
that the story is precarious in what it delivers otherwise.  
 
Storytelling, for Hoffmann, provides the fertile ground for his philosophical 
investigation into language in general.  For Hoffmann, storytelling is the 
category of linguistic communication that is most connected to visualization.  
The connection is so immediate that the words are almost causal.  Storytelling is 
language that conjures the image.  Sometimes, this conjuring provokes an 
overwhelming feeling of anxiety, despite its desire to do the opposite.  The 
narration of “The Sandman” relays Nathaniel’s destitute need, from his early 
childhood up until the tragic end of his life, for an image or picture to give him 
certainty about the given story’s truth. Reading “The Sandman,” we share 
Nathaniel’s paranoia and need to know [what is real] for certain, and we can 
identify with his frequent anxious calling for an image to moderate his doubt.  
 
35 E.T.A. Hoffman, “Der Sandmann/The Sandman,” bilingual edition, trans. John Oxenford, Berlin: Michael 
Holzinger, 2015 [1817], 16.  
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Hoffmann positions Nathaniel’s anxious letter to his friend Lothaire as the 
introduction to the entire story, immediately setting the tone of uneasiness that 
pervades the story to come: “Certainly you must all be uneasy that I have not 
written for so long.”36 Nathaniel then proceeds to defend the absence of his 
communication as a delayed symptom of a childhood trauma: the trauma of 
hearing the bedtime story of “The Sandman” when he was a child.  He entreats 
his friend, Lothaire, and by extension, us, his other readers:  
 
I must use every endeavor to collect myself, and patiently and quietly must 
tell you so much of my early youth as will bring the picture plainly and 
clearly before your eyes.  As I am about to begin, I fancy that I hear you 
laughing, and Clara exclaiming, ‘Childish stories indeed!’”37  
 
Here, Nathaniel attributes to Clara, his beloved and also Lothaire’s siter, her 
typical bourgeois sensibility when he projectively cites her censuring words, 
“’Childish stories indeed!’” The word “indeed” merits closer reading.  In the 
original German38, “indeed” is rechte, meaning “right”.  It is a term of emphasis, 
and the phrase functions here, and throughout the story, as a sort of 
judgmental, super-egoic counterpoint to Nathaniel’s ever-increasing doubt and 
uncertainty.   
 
Nathaniel’s attempt to “collect himself” for the purpose of presenting a clear 
picture for his reader’s eyes sets the agenda, and philosophical predicament, of 
the story.  Images offer, within Hoffmann’s complex scenario, a corresponding 
and sometimes comforting anchor for stories, childish or otherwise.  Nathaniel 
recalls, in his opening letter to Lothaire, the comfort he felt as a child from 
looking at picture-books while his father told stories on cozy evenings, relayed 
to the children over his beer and calming pipe smoke.  But these warm evenings 
would invariably be interrupted by the melancholy directive of his mother, who 
successively ushered the children up to bed with the announcement, “Now, 
 
36 Hoffmann, 3.   
37 Hoffmann, my emphasis. 
38 »Das sind ja rechte Kindereien!«, which translates, literally as “These are really right childishnesses!” 
(Thank you to Marei Schweitzer for her helpful translation.) 
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children, to bed, to bed; the Sandman’s coming, I can see.”39 And so Nathaniel 
dutifully went to bed, hearing the slow step up the stairs of the Sandman.   
 
Nathaniel tells his reader (Lothaire, and us) that he became obsessed with 
knowing what the Sandman looked like, ignoring his mother’s assurance that 
The Sandman was just an expression, a way to make children close their eyes 
and go to sleep for fear of getting sand sprinkled into their eyes. Unsatisfied by 
his mother’s explanation, Nathaniel asked his sister’s nurse what sort of man 
the Sandman really was. The nurse’s story stayed with Nathaniel throughout his 
life, and formed the core of much Uncanny literature to come: 
 
Eh, Natty,… don’t you know that yet? He is a wicked man, who 
comes to children when they won’t go to bed, and throws a handful 
of sand into their eyes, so that they start out bleeding from their 
heads.  He puts their eyes in a bag, and carries them to the crescent 
moon to feed his own children, who sit in the next up there.  They 
have crooked beaks like owls so that they can pick up the eyes of 
naughty human children.40  
 
The old woman’s story conjured up a “frightful picture” which “impressed on 
[Nathaniel’s] mind.” The Sandman was a “spectre” (a word which comes from 
the Latin specere, to look or look at), an “image… [which] did not become any 
more faint.”41 The boy’s obsession took the form of compulsive image-making: 
“I was always drawing [The Sandman] with chalk or charcoal on the tables, 
cupboards and walls.”42 Soon, Nathaniel’s wild turns of the imagination became 
realized: Coppelius, the repulsive advocate whose evening visits caused his 
parents to feel so solemn, became one and the same “spectral monster” as the 
fictional Sandman.  Nathaniel’s lengthy detailed description of every aspect of 
Coppelius provided his reader with a vivid illustration, which was able to be 
conveyed upon the boy’s having peeped through a curtain.   
 
 
39 Hoffmann, 4.  
40 Hoffmann, 4-5. 
41 Hoffmann, 7.   
42 Hoffmann, 5.  
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It was Nathaniel’s act of “peeping” that instigated the central trauma of “The 
Sandman”: he describes his father and Coppelius, huddled over a fireplace, with 
various sorts of utensils all around.  He then saw Coppelius use hot tongs to 
extract glowing objects out of the smoke which he then hammered. Nathaniel 
anxiously recalls: “It seemed to me, as if I saw human faces around without any 
eyes—but with deep holes instead.”  ‘Eyes here, eyes!’ said Coppelius in a dark 
roaring voice. Overcome by the wildest terror, I shrieked out, and fell from my 
hiding place…” Coppelius’ response to discovering Nathaniel’s peeping elicited 
the following response: “’Now we have eyes enough—a pretty pair of child’s 
eyes’  And then, taking some red-hot grains out of the flames with his bare 
hands, he was about to sprinkle them in my eyes.” (ibid, 8) This central trauma 
of the story forms the narrative core, but it also gives us the primary clue as to 
the ambivalence that informs and structures “uncanniness” in Hoffmann’s critical 
thinking. While we tend to use our eyes to secure knowledge through the 
reassurance of the image, these eyes are also the sites of trauma, literally, in 
their potential extraction.  Furthermore, even when eyes remain intact, an 
image before us is also anxiety-producing in that it may very well not produce 
the security of certainty.  
 
The act of telling a story thus carries with it a highly ambivalent desire for 
seeing an accompanying image: we want to supplement the story with what we 
see with “our own corporeal eyes”, but we are at risk of them being viciously 
extracted, particularly if we fall asleep or if we “peep”.  From that traumatic 
point onwards, Nathaniel writes, “tormented by restlessness and an inward 
anguish perfectly indescribable, I could not close my eyes. The hateful, 
abominable Coppelius stood before me with fiery eyes, and laughed at me 
maliciously. It was in vain that I endeavored to get rid of his image.”43 Once 
beheld in “reality,” the Sandman’s image that Nathaniel had longed to see in 
such a desperate way, became an unbearable spectre, haunting his imagination, 
indelibly ingrained.  Reading “The Sandman,” we share Nathaniel’s paranoia. The 
Sandman, by being interchangeable semiotically with Coppelius and later with 
the figure of the optician Coppola, makes the literary figment of the evil 
Sandman equally as “real” as those characters, who, because they exist outside 
the frame of the nurse’s fictional story of The Sandman, signify to the reader 
 
43 Hoffmann, 10. 
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that they might be “real.” 
  
So, Nathaniel cannot close his eyes for fear of falling asleep, because doing so 
would make his eyes vulnerable to being extracted. In the stop-motion 
animation Coraline, the opening sequence, discussed above, illustrates the 
vulnerability of the protagonist, Coraline, by depicting a ragdoll which is 
progressively taken apart, stitch by stitch, by a pair of disembodied metallic 
bony hands. The doll’s button eyes are unstitched too.  The doll is then placed 
on its back, surrounded by dissection tools.  We watch the spider-like hands 
choosing a new pair of buttons from a drawer of hundreds of pairs of buttons, 
then sewing them (the needle poking through the button holes creating quite a 
creepy effect) onto the doll. Henry Selick’s animation builds upon the figure of 
the button eyes from Gaiman’s novella. Gaiman deploys the button eyes as an 
indicator of how central eyes and acts of seeing are to a literature of The 
Uncanny.44  Gaiman’s, and then Sellick’s, strangely unnerving use of button eyes 
on the characters who reside within the other half of Coraline’s new house are 
direct descendants of the eyes stolen by Hoffmann’s original figure of The 
Sandman/Coppelius/Coppola.  
 
As an introduction to Coppola the travelling optician,the important character 
who is introduced later in the original Sandman story, I would like to return very 
briefly to Freud’s essay on The Uncanny, which includes the following footnote: 
“Frau Dr. Rank has pointed out the association of the name with 
‘coppella’=crucible, connecting it with the chemical operations that cause 
[Nathaniel’s] father’s death; and also with ‘coppo’+ eye-socket.”45  In the 
second half of Hoffmann’s story, which shifts from epistolary format to first-
person narration, we learn of what happens once Nathaniel is a young adult, 
 
44 The examples of uncanny illustration which depict strange eyes, or blocked eyes, or empty eyes, abound: the post-
production addition of real human eyes into the puppets of the stop motion film Madame Tutli- Putli (National Film Board 
of Canada, 2007); the vacant white eyes of the puppets in the Brothers’ Quay’s Street of Crocodiles (1986); the deep 
dark eye sockets of Morpheus in Gaiman’s serial graphic novel The Sandman; the figure of Mr. Barron, the evil 
Shapeshifter or “Wight” (named for his milky white eyes), played by Samuel L. Jackson in Tim Burton’s film Miss 
Peregrin’s Home for Peculiar Children (2016), whose white eyes signify his character’s desperate need to steal childrens’ 
eyes… the list could go on.  
45 Freud, “The Uncanny,” SE, footnote 1, 230. 
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away studying at university. From his apartment, Nathaniel can see the home of 
his professor, Spalanzani, across the way, whose strange, stiff, but beautiful 
daughter always sits at the window.  The story of the Sandman and the horrible 
figure of Coppelius, who may or may not have been responsible for Nathaniel’s 
father’s death, happened long ago in Nathaniel’s life, but it now returns in the 
figure of a man who reminds him of Coppelius/the Sandman: the optician 
Coppola. As he is writing to his beloved Clara, Nathaniel hears a knock on his 
door.  A man pushes his way into his room, despite Nathaniel saying he did not 
want to buy a barometer.  The man replied: “I have besides pretty eyes too- 
pretty eyes!” to which Nathaniel cried in horror: “Madman! How can you have 
eyes? Eyes?”46 The salesman then produced many pairs of spectacles from his 
coat pocket, which eventually covered an entire table, reawakening Nathaniel’s 
traumatic childhood encounter with The Sandman/Coppelius:  
 
A thousand eyes glanced, and quivered convulsively and stared at 
Nathaniel; yet he could not look away from the table, where Coppola kept 
still laying down still more and more spectacles, while flaming glances 
were intermingled more and more wildly, and shot their blood- red rays 
into Nathaniel’s breast.47  
 
After coming around from this momentary relapse, Nathaniel decides to 
purchase a tiny pocket telescope.  As the narrator tells us, “Never in his life had 
[Nathaniel] met a glass which brought objects so sharply, plainly and clearly 
before his eyes.  Involuntarily [my emphasis; Unwillkürlich in the original German] 
he looked into Spalanzani’s room; Olympia was sitting as usual before the little 
table…”48  As soon as he tries out Coppola’s telescope, Nathaniel forgets his 
fiancée Clara and becomes mesmerized and obsessed with Olympia. When 
Professor Spalanzani holds a grand party introducing his invention/”daughter” 
Olympia, Nathaniel pledges his unequivocal love for her and is unable to see 
that she is, in fact, an automaton, despite his friends observing that she is 
rather strangely mechanical and stiff. His friend Sigismund tries to explain his 
reservations to Nathaniel about Olympia:  
 
46 Hoffmann, 23.  
47 Hoffmann, 23. 
48 Hoffmann, 24. 
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To us—pray do not take ill, brother, she appears singularly stiff and  
soulless… She might pass for beautiful if her glance were not so utterly 
without a ray of life—without the power of seeing.  Her pace is strangely 
measured, every movement seems to depend on some wound-up 
clockwork… We find your Olympia quite uncanny, and prefer to have 
nothing to do with her.”49 
 
Nathaniel’s obsession with Olympia is, of course, ironically, a blind obsession; he 
cannot see clearly what his friends can see about Olympia, namely, that she is 
an automaton.  As the narration tells us, Nathaniel takes out his telescope at 
the party in order to have a clearer vision of his beloved Olympia.  In many 
stagings of the opera version of “The Sandman,” Offenbach’s Tales of Hoffmann, 
Nathaniel is shown wearing dark round glasses at Spalanzani’s party. From the 
French libretto of the opera we can follow Nathaniel’s words about his love for 
Olympia; he “knows” that he loves her: “Je connais, Je connais”50 Here the irony 
of connaissance becomes clear, and resonates with the English etymology of 
uncanny, best accessed as Freud did in the German version, through the 
positive, yet ambivalent term, canny: “being cautious and shrewd; fortunate, 
lucky; free from unnatural powers.”51 Nathaniel’s knowing what he knows comes 
from his acquired “eyes,” which, despite being a tool for clarification, have 
actually rendered his vision completely unreliable.  Not only is Nathaniel’s 
knowledge not helped by the lens he has bought from Coppola, but he has been 
duped into the belief that better vision would cure uncanniness of the 
automaton itself. 
 
We are given a clue to Nathaniel’s misgivings about his own naïve credulity: 
“Ah, thought Nathaniel, [Coppola] is laughing at me because, no doubt, I have 
paid him too much for this little glass.”52  One of Hoffmann’s and Freud’s most 
astute readers, the theorist Samuel Weber, notes the significance of this 
 
49 Hoffmann, 29. Here, I have taken the liberty to diverge slightly from the translation at hand to include 
the English word “uncanny” which had been mistranslated here from the original German word 
“unheimlich” to mean “unpleasant”, which of course erases my central point! 
50 Offenbach, Tales of Hoffmann, Act 1, 1881. 
51 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary. 
52 Hoffmann, 24. 
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moment of self-doubt in Nathaniel.53 Thinking that he heard Coppola laughing at 
him, Nathaniel’s paranoia set in, emanating from the anxiety that something, 
something which was to help him see more, was actually, on some level, 
deleterious, taking away “too much.” Nathaniel has invested in seeing, and in 
seeing better, only to find out that Olympia is an automaton: in the dramatic 
scene of the horrific return of the initial traumatic event of the Sandman’s visit, 
Nathaniel sees his beloved Olympia’s eyes fall out of their sockets as Professor 
Spalanzani and Coppola fight over her body, breaking it to pieces.  Nathaniel’s 
fantasy similarly shatters to pieces, and the irony of his vision actually being 
impaired by the special lens which he purchased is not lost on the reader, nor on 
any of the characters within the scene.  Hoffmann is presenting the risk of 
investing too much in vision itself as a framework for knowing, and at this 
climactic point of the story, the reader is also implicated in the result of 
investing too heavily in the need for the supplement by the image.   
 
The need for the supplement of the image seems to persist throughout 
Hoffmann’s narrative as an invocation for a base-line of reality which would act 
as a reference point of certainty within doubt. The psychiatrist Adam Bresnick 
reads the intellectual uncertainty of the reader of “The Sandman” as a function 
of Hoffmann’s narrative techniques, which “inveigle the reader” into identifying 
with Nathaniel: “… at stake is not merely uncertainty about a given plot, but a 
radical doubt about who is reading and what—or whom--- is being read, as the 
reader fantasmatically projects himself into the tale, dissolving the frame that 
would insure his ontological separation from the art-work.”54 In this radical 
reading scenario, it is no wonder that we are all scrambling for certainty, hoping 
that an image might do something that language does not. 
 
Hoffmann’s focus on the eyes, and on the eye sockets (coppo), what Samuel 
Weber remarked upon as ocular anxiety,55 presages Freud’s castration anxiety. 
Weber’s term does come from having read Freud’s essay on The Uncanny: 
 
53 Samuel Weber, “The Sideshow, or: Remarks on a Canny Moment,” MLN, Vol. 88, No. 6, Comparative 
Literature (December 1973). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1117. 
54 Adam Bresnick, “Prosopoetic Compulsion: Reading the Uncanny in Freud and Hoffmann,” The Germanic 
Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, 71:2, 1996, 1114, 118. 
55 Weber, 1113. 
 29 
ocular anxiety comes from the jarring revelation of “non-perception,” that is, 
when the child sees his mother naked for the first time and is shocked into 
feeling castrated because he sees that she does not have a phallus. Weber 
elaborates: 
 
… the eyes… play a decisive role in the peculiar non-discovery of 
castration. Not merely do the eyes present the subject with the shocking 
"evidence " of a negative perception--the absence of the maternal phallus-
-but they also have to bear the brunt of the new state of affairs, which 
confronts the subject with the fact that it will never again be able to 
believe its eyes, since what they have seen is neither simply visible nor 
wholly invisible… what is involved here is restructuring of experience, 
including the relation of perception, desire and consciousness, in which 
the narcissistic categories identity and presence are riven by a difference 
they can no long subdue or command.56  
Weber’s psychoanalytic explication of “The Sandman” elucidates how Hoffmann 
recognized, before Freud spelled it out as castration anxiety, the suspensive 
effect of the evidence of negative perception upon the psychic unity of the 
Subject. On some unconscious level, Nathaniel seems to be aware that his own 
investment in the security of vision is always going to be improvident. 
 
Nathaniel’s compulsive need for images as narrated throughout “The Sandman” 
can be read as the symptom of a larger crisis which comes through in much 
German Romantic literature, and investigated further by a cluster of literary 
theorists reading Romantic literature,57 which is a crisis about our relation to 
language itself, namely, that cognition, so central to Enlightenment thinking 
about the way in which we use literature to transmit our true, inner thoughts, 
actually relies upon a fictional, artificial aspect of language, namely, figurality. 
Therefore, a pure transmission of Enlightenment ideals of knowledge, certainty, 
and cognition within the self are always going to be riven by the mechanical 
aspects of language, bringing forward an acknowledgement of language as a 
 
56 Weber, 1113. 
57 This cluster would include, primarily, Paul De Man, but also Cynthia Chase, Neil Herz, Samuel Weber, and 
many others, including the psychiatrist Adam Bresnick.  
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kind of exterior, objective material to be manipulated. Uncannily, this 
manipulation of language into a tropic system of literary figures intervenes with 
the subjective realm of intention, in which the function of language is to be a 
transmitter of thought and content.  
 
To bring this abstract point back to “The Sandman”: storytelling, for Hoffmann, 
is the linguistic modality which best distills the double functioning of language.  
First, language describes or conveys the content of a story which may or may 
not have happened.  This function of language/storytelling presumes a referent 
and/or a subjective voice behind the words from which the language comes 
forth. In this metaphysical understanding of language, language is secondary to 
the referent, which is the anchoring “real” event or voice behind language. On 
the other hand, the multiple narrative frames Hoffmann deploys unsteady the 
reader’s grounding in any single point of reference. We find ourselves not 
knowing what is real, what is madness, what is a dream, what is storytelling, 
just like the characters of Nathaniel, and Coraline after him. We are, like these 
characters, manipulated into uncertainty by the storyteller “outside” the story. 
Adam Bresnick clarifies the way in which the reader “acquiesces” to Hoffmann’s 
manipulations through the “porousness” of the narrative frames: 
 
Hoffmann’s tale will performatively demonstrate the porousness of the 
frame that ostensibly separates the reader from the tale being read, just 
as it reveals the essential continuity of the affect driving the responses of 
poor, crazed Nathanael, and his romantic surrogate, the reader. In [Neil] 
Hertz’s excellent formulation, ‘[A]s a result of Hoffmann’s manipulations a 
reader is made to feel, confusedly, that Nathanael’s life, his writings, the 
narrator’s story-telling, Hoffmann’s writing and the reader’s own 
fascinated acquiescence in it, are all impelled by the same energy, and 
impelled precisely to represent that energy…’58 
 
Hoffmann’s maneuvering of narrative frames enunciates his perspective that 
language itself is not an emanation of subjective consciousness the purpose of 
 
58 Adam Bresnick, “Prosopoetic Compulsion: Reading the Uncanny in Freud and Hoffmann,” The 
Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, 71:2, 1996, 122, citing Neil Hertz, “Freud and the 
Sandman,”The End of the Line, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, 21. 
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which is to transmit meaning, but rather, a complex material object that moves 
and can be moved in a way autonomous of life or intention within or behind it. 
This view of language as automaton, moving by its own mechanics, 
characterizes the predicament or crisis of language that Hoffmann recognizes. 
Hoffmann is theorising the psychological conflict which arises in the uncanny 
encounter between storytelling as textual performance, and storytelling as 
conveyer of content and by extension, of cognition.  
 
Cynthia Chase’s reading of another German Romantic writer, Heinrich von Kleist, 
shows that Hoffmann’s philosophical negotiation of language came as part of a 
larger context of early deconstructors of Enlightenment values exploring 
questions of language and referentiality. Chase notes that Kleist writes stories 
about the telling of stories, in which “…stories or facts are recounted, and the 
listeners’ responses form part of a larger narrative… [They are] narratives about 
the effects of narration, and … concern the status of texts.”59 This emphasis on 
the effects and status of the narration point to a concern with the performative 
and also figurative aspects of the text in addition to the story’s content. In her 
essay “Mechanical Doll, Exploding Machine: Kleist’s Models of Narrative,” 
expanding upon the theories of Paul De Man, Chase analyses the encounter 
between figurality and referentiality in Kleist’s essay “On the Marionette 
Theater” (1810): 
 
[In Kleist’s story about the marionette theater] Every figure is ultimately 
bound by resemblance to what it represents: essentially a metaphor, each 
rests upon a substantial connection with a referential basis.  On the other 
hand, it is assumed that the distinctiveness and the power of the referents 
derive from its very nonconnection from a ground of referents separate 
from it. The essential dimension of the tropological model of the text is its 
figurality. The essential charm of the system is its effective denial of the 
pertinency of facts.  Thus Kleist’s allegorical model representing language 
as at once totally unhinged from the reality of reference, and tied in with a 
referential dimension as ineluctable as the law of gravity.60   
 
59 Cynthia Chase, Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition, 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 145. 
60 Chase, Cynthia, 145. 
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Like the marionettes observed by Kleist, our use of language moves between 
the “ineluctable” force of gravity—that is, the human need for referentiality, 
certainty and knowing, and the perhaps inevitable untethering of language as its 
own moving object, with its own mechanical direction and irrepressible tendency 
towards figuration. Chase’s readings of Kleist’s “allegories of the force of 
language” contextualize what I have been proposing as the uncanniness that 
comes from the encounter between language offering the security of meaning 
because of a certain relation to its referent, and language as moving, and 
moveable, object. In the former case, language is descriptive; in the latter, 
language is performative and non-referential. The theorist Paul De Man’s 
extensive reading of Romantic allegories of reading which Chase is expanding 
upon is characterized further by another De Manian theorist, Neil Hertz, as 
identifying a “pathos of uncertain agency” which comes out of Romantic 
literature’s dwelling on the difference between language as meaning and 
language as performance.61 What I want to suggest is that The Uncanny is the 
name or mark for the impact of that “pathos of uncertain agency.”  This impact 
is a psychological impact based upon the workings of language. Adam Bresnick 
describes the workings of language in “The Sandman,” citing the philosopher 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: 
 
…it is this disturbance-- or perhaps more accurately, this revelation—of 
the everyday function of language, more than any single thematic element 
we might locate at the level of the plot, that provides the most salient 
occasion of the uncanny in Hoffmann’s ‘Sandman.’ As Philipppe Lacoue-
Labarthe has suggested, ‘It follows that the Unheimliche is essentially a 
matter of language, or that language is the site of the Unheimliche… it is 
language alone which harbors the Unheimliche as a possibility.’ Indeed, it 
is precisely by virtue of entrusting himself to the sly workings of 
Hoffmann’s language that the reader of ‘The Sandman’ will be seduced 
into the workings of the uncanny.62 
 
61 Chase, Cynthia, 145. 
61 Hertz, Neil, “Lurid Figures,” in Reading De Man Reading, ed. Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1989), 100. 
62 Bresnick,120, citing Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Catastrophe: A Reading of Paul Celan’s ‘The 
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“The Uncanny” names the predicament in which we, the reader, find ourselves 
when language is recognized as not only a continuity of our own or others’ 
animated subjectivity but as an object in and of itself, which operates and 
performs outside of our conscious intention.  Like the automaton, which, at the 
time during which Hoffmann wrote his uncanny stories, was circulating as a 
figure of fascination and discomfort, language moves between representing 
something else (“real” or otherwise), and operating as if it were a manipulatable 
machine that can move on its own.  This ambivalence that comprises language 
confronts the reader with the suspension of certainty, and of knowledge.  
 
That language can move and be moved as if it were an object disconnected from 
intention and understanding throws us into a crisis, and this crisis extends into 
the concept of illustration. In “The Sandman,” we are deprived of a stable 
narrative keel that ensures our knowledge and certainty about what and who 
are “real” in the story.  Storytelling is put forth as the allegorical form for the 
proposition that language itself is not steadying. However, as Hoffmann shows 
us in the complex characterisation of Nathaniel, neither is the supplement of the 
visual image any more steadying. Both good storytelling and good illustration 
rely upon tropes and figuration as their fundamental mode of representing 
something, but seemingly, it is figuration, in the sense that it is mechanical, 
which introduces the ambivalence and the strange relation to language. Freud 
understood this drive towards figuration as a compulsion to repeat, to recognize 
similar figures recurring within a given text. The strange, “uncanny” repetition 
was such because figures happened outside of our conscious control, as if we 
were objects of a larger, unseen power.  Jentsch had already, before Freud, 
recognized that movement, not simply animation, of objects might be the 
source of uncertainty and doubt because movement does not carry the 
metaphysical intention of animating spirit. Historically and philosophically, 
illustration and The Uncanny are interwoven in complex ways: illustration 
traditionally gives image to an anchoring text, clarifying and informing it; but it 
can just as easily not do so, frustrating what we think we can know about a 
given story. Many illustrators of stories have chosen to grapple with 
uncanniness, I believe, because the objects of illustration (houses, moving 
 
Meridian,” Oxford Literary Review, 15 (1993), 12. 
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objects, faces, eyes, etc) make for good story content. But these illustrators are 
also intrigued by the precariousness of what an image can tell us for certain, 
enjoying the liabilities of the illustrative relation itself much in the same way 
that E.T.A. Hoffmann seemed to relish the inveigling of his attentive, but 
uncertain, reader.   
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